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This commentary consists of three parts. The first attempts to summarize the main theme of 
Weinstein’s paper, insofar as I can understand it; the latter qualification is obvious and almost 
redundant, except that I must confess I found it very challenging to make sense of his essay. The 
second part of my commentary advances some negative criticism of his paper, by focusing on 
issues of conceptual clarity and argumentative cogency. The third part elaborates a positive 
appreciation of what seems to be Weinstein’s main claim; I do so mostly on the basis of things 
which he does not even mention, but with which I happen to be acquainted. 
 
1. Interpretation 
 
A big part of Weinstein’s paper (sect. 3, pp. 3-6) offers an account of the history and 
methodology of physical chemistry (primarily atomic theory) in terms of three epistemological 
notions, which he labels consilience, breadth, and depth. He defines these three concepts as 
follows: “consilience, requires that theories are increasingly supported by a body of evidence 
that is improving in scope and detail. Breadth requires that a theory explains an increasing 
number of diverse phenomena, and depth requires that a theory is reinterpreted in terms of 
higher-order explanatory frameworks that connect it to other theories of increasing breadth and 
increasing evidentiary adequacy” (p. 6). 
 An even bigger part of Weinstein’s paper (sects. 4-5, pp. 6-10) presents a similar account of 
the recent history of cognitive science that includes not only theories of cognition, but also 
theories of emotions, as well as theories of the neuro-physiology of the brain. In his own words: 
 
As the models, indicated below, show, the brain coordinates functions across an array of inputs permitting an 
integrated response that enables perception, memory and purposes to bring together information necessary for 
coordinated action in the world. I see this as a clear parallel with consilience, the increasing systematic 
effectiveness across areas [of] concern as the sciences develop and new problems are confronted. Second, the 
brain integrates the broad array of disparate information, proprioceptive, hormonal, electrical, and chemical, 
integrating new input with stored input and modifying content in relation to newly acquired stimuli of many 
kinds. This seems to me parallel to breadth. Most importantly, all of these functions are accounted for on 
increasingly defined more abstract levels, moving from gross physiological function to the operation at the 
cellular level, and if we accept materialism, to the molecular level, as we understand the functions of the 
neurological array [based] on the deepest physiological levels. This has a clear parallel with depth, the 
reinterpretation of a theory in terms of a higher order, more abstract and more deeply ontological sense of the 
ultimate real[i]ties behind the phenomena. [P. 9] 
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 The paper ends (sect. 7, “Conclusion,” pp. 10-11) with what looks like a plea that informal 
logic and argumentation theory model themselves on physical chemistry and cognitive science, 
by taking serious the epistemological ideals of consilience, breadth, and depth. Here, Weinstein 
advances several suggestions, the most striking of which is this: that the analysis of “argument 
must move from structure to the functions the structures exemplify, and in particular, the 
function of warrants that reflect the underlying networks of commitments in directing and 
sustaining argument. This requires more than a complication of argument diagramming, but 
rather a movement into the detail of support: how commitments to warrants and the networks of 
beliefs that they represent alter the evaluation of evidence, both evidence sought and evidence 
already available” (pp. 10-11). This suggestion is striking because it also corresponds to the main 
message which Weinstein seems to want to convey in his paper’s title, abstract, and introduction. 
Indeed, in the preliminary section (no. 2, “Setting the problem,” pp. 1-3) Weinstein confesses 
that this paper is his latest attempt to elaborate and justify a thesis he has advocated for a long 
time: “My suggestion over many years and many papers is that the analysis and evaluation of 
arguments requires a focus on warrants. But the adequacy of warrants, whether construed as 
generalizations or inference tickets, shifts the focus from evidence to the commitments through 
which evidence is selected, organized and applied. Concern with warrants moves the analysis of 
argument into a subject-matter dependent stance” (p. 3; cf. Weinstein 1990a; 1990b; 2003; 2011; 
2013). 
 
2. Criticism 
 
One difficulty I have with this pertains to the clarity of the three concepts of consilience, breadth, 
and depth; it leaves much to be desired, to say the least. 
 For example, we are told that consilience refers to the increasing scope of the supporting 
evidence, and that breadth refers to the increasing number of diverse phenomena explained; but 
these two things sound the same to me. Similarly, consilience also involves increasing details in 
the supporting evidence, which seems to be what depth is all about. Thus, I don’t see that 
consilience is a distinct concept, above and beyond breadth and depth; as defined by Weinstein, 
consilience seems to repeat what breadth and depth require. Part of the confusion may stem from 
the fact that consilience as ordinarily understood is a relationship between two or more theories, 
whereas Weinstein seems to treat it as a (monadic) property of a theory. 
 Accordingly, Weinstein’s application of these concepts to physical chemistry and to 
cognitive science is correspondingly confusing, if not confused. For example, at one point in the 
history of physical chemistry it was discovered that protons and the atomic numbers of elements 
were to be supplemented with neutrons and atomic weights. To me, it’s not at all clear whether 
the resulting more adequate theory possessed greater breadth, or greater depth, or greater 
consilience, or all three, or none of the three. With regard to cognitive science, I think I 
understand that, if and to the extent that emotions can be explained in terms of cognition, then 
the breadth of cognitive science is enhanced; on the other hand, if and to the extent that cognitive 
states and phenomena can be explained on the basis of neuro-physiological processes, then the 
breadth of neuro-physiological theory is enhanced. However, I don’t see that any of this yields 
an enhancement of the depth or consilience of any one of these theories. 
 Independently of this difficulty, there is another one which seems to me even more serious. 
That is, Weinstein’s methodological and epistemological analysis of physical chemistry and of 
cognitive science says (almost) nothing about the reasoning and arguments advanced or used by 
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physical chemists or cognitive scientists. Thus, I don’t see that from such an analysis anything 
follows about how informal logicians and argumentation theorists ought to conduct and practice 
their business, namely the interpretation, evaluation, and analysis of arguments. In other words, 
insofar as Weinstein’s effort in this paper (as summarized above) is itself an argument, it is an 
obvious instance of non-sequitur. On the other hand, perhaps this paper is not advancing an 
argument; in that case, it would be a non-argument about non-arguments. In either case, the 
relevance of the paper would be the issue. 
 
3. Appreciation 
 
Despite the destructive criticism just considered, I believe there is something right and important 
in the main claim asserted by Weinstein in this paper’s title, abstract, introduction, and 
conclusion. At least, this is so if I understand it right. Again, as formulated in the introduction, 
the claim is that the analysis of argumentation should “focus less on evidence that contradicts 
claims and … [more on] the network of warrants that support the selecting and evaluating of 
evidentiary moves” (p. 1). 
     Here, as a preliminary, let me say that I applaud the way in which Weinstein starts his 
substantive discussion. He does so by referring to some current articles by columnists in the New 
York Times. One of his examples is a recent column by Paul Krugman (2020) that discusses the 
politicians running to be nominated by the Democratic Party as this party’s candidate in the 2020 
election for President of the United States. At one point, Krugman raises the issue of the cause of 
the Great Recession of 2008, in order to criticize some of the candidates and defend others. His 
own view is that the cause was “the erosion of effective financial regulation over the previous 
few decades” (Krugman 2020, p. 22). He dismisses alternative accounts as “zombie ideas—ideas 
that should have been killed by evidence, but just keep lurching along” (ibid.). One of these is 
the “narrative in which liberals somehow caused the crisis by forcing poor innocent bankers to 
lend money” (ibid.) to people who could not repay it. On this, Weinstein comments that “clearly, 
both of these claims may be considered reasonably appropriate evidence supporting claims about 
the cause of the financial crisis, and equally clearly the evidence does not in any way resolve the 
dispute as to which point of view is a ‘zombie’ ” (p. 2). 
 In other words, Weinstein is attributing to Krugman a denial of his own thesis about 
“warranting evidence in diverse evidentiary settings” (p. 1). Now, with all due respect to 
Krugman (who is an M.I.T. graduate, a Princeton emeritus professor, and the 2008 Nobel Prize 
laureate in economics), I believe Weinstein’s attribution is essentially accurate. In fact, 
Krugman’s columns frequently display such an approach (Krugman 2012; 2014; 2015; 2016). I 
also agree with Weinstein that such a practice is very damaging and undesirable for anyone 
engaged in argumentation. 
 Weinstein also deserves credit for calling attention to a recent New York Times column by a 
mathematician entitled “Mismeasuring the coronavirus,” which explains how “up-to-the-minute 
reports and statistics can unintentionally distort the facts” (Paulos 2020). Although such a 
problem will be familiar to an applied logician or philosopher of science, in light of the ongoing 
pandemic it is extremely useful to discuss the problem in terms of the current situation. And I 
also agree with Weinstein that this article (unlike Krugman’s) seems to illustrate and confirm 
Weinstein’s own main thesis. 
 Let us now go on to an area which I want to exploit by using its material to illustrate and 
justify Weinstein’s main claim, at least partially, and at least in my own way. The topic is the 
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Copernican Revolution, understood as the transition from a geostatic and geocentric world view 
to a heliocentric and geokinetic world view; this transition started roughly in 1543 with the 
publication of Nicolaus Copernicus’s On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres and ended 
roughly in 1687 with the publication of Isaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural 
Philosophy. What makes this development especially relevant in the present context is the fact 
that for about a century and one-half there was a controversy consisting of all kinds of arguments 
for and against the motion of the earth; indeed such pro- and anti-Copernican arguments 
probably constitute the richest collection of argumentation in the history of thought. In this 
regard, the contributions and works of Galileo Galilei are especially relevant and instructive 
because he was very much aware of such a logical aspect of the Copernican controversy and was 
able to make epoch-making contributions to its resolution (cf. Finocchiaro 1980; 1997; 2010; 
2014; 2019). 
     In his 1543 book, Copernicus had shown that the known facts about the motion of the 
heavenly bodies could be explained in quantitative detail if one assumes that the earth rotates 
daily on its own axis and revolves yearly in an orbit around the sun. Such an explanation was not 
only a novel alternative to the geostatic explanation, but also simpler, more coherent, and less ad 
hoc. However, although better, the Copernican theory was not conclusively proved, because of 
the explanatory form of its supporting argument, and also because of the existence of many 
apparently unanswerable counter-arguments. Let’s examine some of these. 
     Some of the objections were epistemological, the most famous being the argument from the 
deception of the senses. That is, direct sense-experience reveals that the earth stands still; for 
example, we do not feel any terrestrial motion; and we see heavenly bodies move around the 
earth. Thus, if the earth were in motion, our senses would be deceiving us—would not be telling 
us the truth. But this is absurd, since the human senses are the main instruments we have to learn 
about reality. 
     Some of the anti-Copernican arguments were religious or theological. The most common of 
these was the scriptural argument. That is, it is stated or implied in many passages of the Bible 
that the earth stands still at the center of the universe; for example, in Joshua 10:12-13, God does 
the miracle of stopping the sun from setting, so that daylight would last longer, in answer to 
Joshua’s prayer that the Israelites were engaged in a battle with the Amorites, and their 
advantage would be lost if the sun set and night came. Now, the Bible cannot err, and so the 
earth does not move. 
 However, another group of arguments were mechanical, in the sense of being based on the 
motion of bodies near the surface of the earth. One was the vertical fall argument. That is, it can 
be easily observed that freely falling bodies move vertically; for example, this is what happens to 
rain when there is no wind; and if one drops a rock from a window, the rock lands at the foot of 
the building. Now, such vertical fall could not happen on a rotating earth, because the freely 
falling body would be left behind while the ground and the building would be carried eastward 
by the earth’s rotation, and so the body would land to the west of where it was dropped, after 
following a slanted path. Therefore, the earth does not rotate. 
 Another mechanical argument was based on the range of gunshots toward the east and 
toward the west. Again, observation and experience reveal that eastward gunshots reach a 
distance equal to that of westward gunshots. This could not happen if the earth were rotating, 
because on a rotating earth the distance traveled by eastward gunshots would be the difference 
between their own projectile motion and the eastward motion of the gun carried by the earth, 
whereas the distance traveled by westward gunshots would be the sum of their own projectile 
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motion and the same eastward motion of the gun carried by the rotating earth. The conclusion is, 
again, that the earth cannot rotate. 
A third mechanical argument was based on the extruding power of whirling, as at that time 
they called what today we would call centrifugal force. That is, if the earth were rotating, then 
bodies on its surface should fly off toward the heavens, because such bodies would find 
themselves in a whirling system, which for example at the equator would be undergoing a speed 
of about 1,000 miles per hour, and we know that such whirling generates an extruding power 
away from the center of rotation. However, such extrusion is not observed, but rather even a 
feather (when there is no wind) can lie on the ground motionless and undisturbed. It follows that 
the earth cannot be undergoing rotational motion. 
 The resolution of the Copernican controversy required not only the invention and 
construction of new arguments supporting the earth’s motion, but also the refutation of the 
arguments against it. If we look at Galileo’s criticism of the mechanical arguments against the 
earth’s motion, we can, I believe, get closer to the topic anticipated above. Here, there will be 
time and space only for the vertical-fall argument, although similar considerations would apply 
to the east-west gunshot argument and to the extrusion argument. Galileo’s critique of the 
vertical-fall argument is the following. 
 It is not true that on a rotating earth freely falling bodies would be left behind during their 
fall. The reason is that if the earth were rotating, before a given body started falling freely, it 
would be carried by the earth’s rotation; for example, if I am dropping a rock from a window, 
while the rock is still in my hand, it would be carried along toward the east, together with my 
hand, my body, and the building. As an approximation, considering a small part of the earth’s 
surface, we can say that on a rotating earth, before the body started to fall down, it would possess 
an horizontal motion toward the east. Now, this horizontal eastward motion would not be lost but 
would be retained after the body started falling. The reason for this is that motion, once acquired, 
is conserved, unless it is subject to disturbance or interferences; this claim may be called the 
principle of the conservation of motion, which corresponds to the law of the conservation of 
momentum and the law of inertia of modern physics. Because of conservation of motion, on a 
rotating earth the falling body, besides falling, would also be moving eastward, so as to land at 
the foot of the building, with an apparent vertical trajectory. Nor would it be correct say, as the 
anti-Copernicans would be inclined to say, that on a rotating earth, the falling body’s horizontal 
motion would not be conserved because its vertically downwards motion would interfere with it; 
here the anti-Copernican would be running counter to the principle of the composition of motion, 
which stipulates if and how motions in different directions are combined. 
In short, in his criticism of the vertical-fall argument against the earth’s motion, Galileo was 
appealing to the principles of conservation and of composition of motion. In so doing he was 
pointing out that this anti-Copernican argument presupposed such principles as the following: 
that motion (even uniform motion) requires a force in order to continue, otherwise it 
spontaneously dissipates; and that bodies can have one and only natural motion (so that on a 
rotating earth a falling body could not simultaneously move eastward and downward). Now, it 
turned out that the principles of conservation and of composition became an integral part of 
modern physics, and that the just-mentioned anti-Copernican principles were part of the 
Aristotelian physics which had to be rejected. However, in the historical context, besides 
providing the analysis elaborated above, Galileo could not simply assert the principles of 
conservation and of composition; he had to argue and provide evidence in their support, and he 
did do that (cf. Finocchiaro 2014, pp. 105-112). 
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Nevertheless, in the Galilean analysis elaborated above, it does seem that, to use Weinstein’s 
terminology and framework, there is a “focus less on evidence that contradicts claims and … 
[more on] the network of warrants that support the selecting and evaluating of evidentiary 
moves” (p. 1). That is, the anti-Copernican alleged evidence was vertical fall. Galileo did not 
focus on whether bodies really fall vertically, or whether they deviate in some manner. Instead, 
he focused on the network of warrants which made vertical fall so crucial, namely the principles 
of Aristotelian physics which the anti-Copernican argument presupposed. And Galileo also 
focused on the network of warrants which made up his own new science of motion, and which 
were to replace the old physics. In this sense, I feel I have illustrated and justified Weinstein’s 
main claim. 
Finally, a qualification is in order. I don’t think that we should exaggerate the correctness or 
applicability of Weinstein’s thesis. In fact, I don’t think it would be of much help in the analysis 
of another group of anti-Copernican arguments. These were the astronomical observational 
arguments. The argument from the earth-heaven dichotomy claimed that the earth cannot revolve 
around the sun because, if it did, it would be a heavenly body, and so the physical properties of 
terrestrial and heavenly bodies would be essentially identical; but they are not. The argument 
from Venus’s phases claimed that the earth cannot move around the sun because, if it did, the 
relative positions of sun, Venus, and the earth would change in such a way that Venus would 
exhibit phases in the course of a year; but no phases of Venus were observable. The argument 
from the appearance of Mars claimed that the earth cannot be the third planet orbiting the sun 
because, if it were, then the distance between it and the fourth planet Mars would change by a 
factor of about eight as they both revolved around the sun at different rates; thus, as seen from 
the earth, Mars should exhibit corresponding changes in apparent brightness and size; but these 
were not observed. And the argument from the apparent position of fixed stars claimed that the 
earth cannot revolve around the sun because, if it did, then in the course of a year (for example, 
at six-month intervals) terrestrial observers would be looking at any one fixed star from a very 
different location, and so its apparent position should exhibit an annual variation; but no such 
variation was observed, and thus the earth could not be in motion. 
Galileo’s criticism of these arguments was that, with the telescope, one could observe the 
phenomena that resulted from the earth’s heliocentric revolution: physical similarities between 
terrestrial and heavenly bodies, phases of Venus, and significant variations in the apparent size of 
Mars. For these arguments, he did not have to examine their warrants and presuppositions; he 
simply refuted their respective minor premises, which is what telescopic observation enabled 
him to do. To be sure, for the argument from the apparent position of fixed stars, even his 
telescope did not reveal any annual variation; and this situation actually forced him to examine 
the warrants and presuppositions of this arguments. However, the elaboration of such 
qualifications is beyond the scope of the present commentary (but cf. Finocchiaro 2014, pp. 167-
209; 2019, pp. 77-92, 137-44). 
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